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COMMENTS
ing general rather than particular rules has much to be said in
its favor. As no two cases present the same factual situation
the end results of efforts to resolve conflicts by providing
numerous solutions may be confusion rather than clarification.
At the very least it seems fair to conclude that some changes in
language should be made if the Code is to be adopted.
Neilson Jacobs
Private Nuisance in Louisiana Law
When one person's use of land interferes with another's use
and enjoyment of a neighboring tract, courts seek the solution
to the resulting controversy in that part of the law of torts called
"nuisance" and characterize defendant's conduct as the mainte-
nance of a nuisance if plaintiff is entitled to relief. A nuisance
and a trespass are similar in that both interfere with the inter-
ests of an occupant of land. They differ, however, in that a
trespass is usually a physical invasion of land complete in one
instance, while a nuisance is ordinarily a continuing activity on
a neighboring tract of land which produces such interferences
as noise, smoke, or odors. The technique of resolving nuisance
controversies differs greatly from that found in other areas of
tort law. In the latter, the process of weighing the various inter-
ests involved in a given controversy has been transformed into
the application of a body of relatively rigid rules, like those
concerning intent, privilege, or negligence. In the field of nui-
sance, however, the factors considered appear on the surface and
the courts weigh those factors against each other openly. For
this reason, one finds no framework of fixed rules to refer to as
the law of nuisance. One can only indicate the recurring factors
considered by the courts in nuisance cases and suggest their
relative weights in the balancing process which is the essence
of deciding such cases.
The Magnitude of the Interference
One's right to the use and enjoyment of his land is of course
limited by the rights of others to use and enjoy their own. On
the basis of this broad generalization, courts refuse to consider
an activity a nuisance unless the interference it creates is sub-
stantial in nature. To be deemed a nuisance, the defendant's
conduct must be such as would interfere with an average man's
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use and enjoyment of land or it must cause an appreciable
diminution of the value of plaintiff's property. Activities offen-
sive only to persons of eccentric tastes and feelings are not
nuisances.1 For example, the crowing of a rooster in the early
morning,2 the establishment of a funeral home,3 and small
amounts of smoke and noise4 do not constitute nuisances.
Extent of Hardship Which Granting Plaintiff Relief Would
Impose on Defendant
This factor in the balancing process is closely interwoven
with society's interest in the continuance of enterprises repre-
senting large investments, employing many workers, and per-
forming useful services. These considerations may lead courts
to deny recovery altogether. For instance, in a case where
defendant had invested several millions of dollars in his paper
mill and was using the only stream available for waste disposal,
the court denied plaintiff relief from the resulting pollution of
his swampland. In another case, plaintiff was denied relief from
the disturbances caused by a city's operation of a garbage dis-
posal plant. The court found that the city was disposing of gar-
bage by the only available means." Similar results were reached
in cases involving a funeral home 7 and a cemetery.8 If such con-
siderations do not result in complete denial of relief, they may
yet induce the court to limit the scope of the injunction issued
or to confine plaintiff's remedy to an award of damages.
The Character of the Neighborhood
Sources of interference other than that of which plaintiff
complains may exist in the neighborhood. Courts have accord-
ingly been influenced by the extent to which an injunction
against defendant's activities would tend to restore plaintiff to
the normal enjoyment of his land. Thus, plaintiff has been
refused relief where he complained of the erection of an ice
plant in an area where a larger one was already in operation,9
and, similarly, where he complained of the slight noises coming
1. Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So.2d 777 (La. App. 1947). See also Froelicher v.
Oswald Ironworks Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903).
2. Myer v. Minard, 21 So.2d 72 (La. App. 1945).
3. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100
(1952); Moss v. Burke and Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So.2d 281 (1941).
4. Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876).
5. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
6. Gibson v. Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637, 109 So. 339 (1926).
7. Moss v. Burke and Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So.2d 281 (1941).
8. Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640 (1927).
9. Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138 (1926).
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from an industrial plant located in a neighborhood abounding in
other noises and disturbances.10
It seems that, if defendant's interference with plaintiff's
interests is slight and no other source of interference exists in
the neighborhood, the courts are more likely to grant plaintiff
relief than if such sources do exist. On the other hand, if defen-
dant's interference is of a substantial nature, the courts are likely
to minimize the importance of other disturbances. For instance,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has said that industrial enterprises
in industrial areas, although not frequently considered nuisances,
may become nuisances if the disturbance they create is extreme
in character."
The type of neighborhood'in which the nuisance controversy
arises is relevant in another respect. Certain activities which
inherently tend to disturb the occupants of adjacent property
cannot well be excluded from all areas. This fact led the court
to deny plaintiff relief where he complained of the emission of
soot from a carbon plant located in a sparsely settled area near
its source of raw materials. 12 In another case, the court con-
sidered that the location of an enterprise which necessarily
employed noisy machinery was such that the disturbance it cre-
ated did not amount to a nuisance.' 3 Similarly, where a city had
virtually approved the location of an industrial plant in a certain
neighborhood by closing streets and otherwise facilitating its
establishment, the court held that the unavoidable smoke and
noise emanating from the plant were inconveniences to which
others in the neighborhood must submit.' 4
When the controversy arises in a neighborhood which is
losing its residential character as a result of the encroachment
of commercial or industrial enterprises, the courts seem reluc-
tant to grant plaintiff relief unless the defendant's industrial or
commercial activities create extreme inconveniences. Where a
machine and boiler works, for example, was operated in a previ-
ously residential area, the court denied plaintiff relief from the
resulting disturbances. 15 However, our Supreme Court has ob-
served that "in a populous part of a city greater precaution must
be taken to avoid inflicting annoyances, discomfort, and distress
10. Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936).
11. Froelicher v. Oswald Ironworks Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903).
12. O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So.2d 230 (1949).
13. Olsen v. Tung, 179 La. 760, 155 So. 16 (1934).
14. Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry-Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927).
15. Ibid.
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than in the open country."16 Similarly, one court of appeal has
said that the establishment of a boiler safety-valve works in a
partially industrialized transition area, even prior to the plain-
tiff's establishment of a residence there, does not accord defen-
dant the privilege of so conducting his activities as to create a
nuisance.17
If defendant's activities are prohibited by zoning ordinances
or police regulations, the courts will almost invariably consider
such activities a nuisance. Thus, where a lawfully located stock-
yard manufactured fertilizer as an incident to the operation of
the, stockyard, and the production of fertilizer in that area was
prohibited by a police jury ordinance, the court held the produc-
tion of fertilizer a nuisance.18 Again, the court granted plaintiff
an injunction and damages where the prohibited "firing" of
defendant's locomotive within the city limits caused the emission
of considerable quantities of smoke, soot, and cinders. 19 Even
where a grocery store had been in operation in a neighborhood
for many years before the city zoned the area as residential, the
court, at the request of a neighboring owner of residential prop-
erty, ordered the store closed on the basis of the zoning ordi-
nance.20 In adopting the position that defendant's activities are
a nuisance per se if prohibited by local ordinance, the courts
display their willingness to abide by the conclusion which the
legislative arm of government has reached by weighing the same
factors that a court would weigh. This acquiescence in legislative
decisions is not a complete abdication of judicial power, however;
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated in one case that "no
lawful use made by an individual of his own property is a nui-
sance per se, nor can it be made so by municipal ordinance .... -21
The Manner in Which the Disturbing Activity Is Conducted
The careful and efficient manner in which defendant con-
ducts the disturbing activities may be a decisive factor in defen-
dant's favor. Thus, plaintiff was refused relief where the noises
16. Tucker v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 125 La. 689, 698, 51 So. 689, 691
(1910), quoted with approval in Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729,
741, 30 So.2d 816, 820 (1947).
17. Ellis v..Blanchard, 45 So.2d 100 (La. App. 1950).
18. Perrin v. Crescent City Stockyard and Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La.
83, 43 So. 938 (1907).
19. Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
20. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929).
21. New Orleans v. Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 462, 52 So. 575, 577 (1910). How-
ever, such a definition is questionable in light of the more recent decision
of State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929).
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produced by an ice plant were unavoidable,22 where spark
arresters on a tramway were of the most modern type,'2 3 where
a laundry used some of the best equipment available,2 4 and where
a carbon plant was equipped with the most modern machinery
obtainable.25 On the other hand, the negligent or otherwise im-
proper conduct of defendant's activities may be a decisive factor
in plaintiff's favor.2 6 In such cases, the court may order the
defendant in general terms to abate the nuisance,27 or order him
to correct that specific phase of his operations which is im-
properly conducted. 28 If, by the time of the trial, defendant has
so changed his methods of operation as to relieve plaintiff of the
disturbance complained of, an injunction ordering defendant to
correct his method of operation will, of course, not be issued.
However, in such cases, plaintiff may recover damages for the
injuries caused prior to the change in operating methods. 29
Plaintiff's Failure to Protest the Establishment of Defendant's
Plant
The court has frequently assigned considerable weight to
plaintiff's acquiescence in the establishment of the enterprise
creating the disturbances of which he complains. The effect of
such acquiescence is greater where plaintiff seeks the removal
or complete abatement of an operation than where his complaint
is confined to some specific phase of defendant's operations.
Thus, where the plaintiff had not objected to the establishment
of an ice plant, the court refused to grant him either damages
or an injunction when he later complained of the noise and
vibration created by the operation of the plant.3 0 Similarly, in
refusing to order the abatement of one phase of defendant's
dry-dock and ship-repair works, the court reminded the plaintiff
home-owner that he had initially approved of the location of
defendant's enterprise in the neighborhood.3 1 Such decisions
leave occupants of land in a quandary. On the one hand, lawfully
22. Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936).
23. Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928).
24. Olsen v. Tung, 179 La. 760, 155 So. 16 (1934).
25. O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So.2d 230 (1949).
26. Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947); McGee
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21 (1944).
27. McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21 (1944).
28. Of. Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
29. Dodd v. Glen Rose Gasoline Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1939).
30. LeBlanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908).
31. Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry-Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927).
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located enterprises are never nuisances per se32 and the com-
mencement of their operations cannot be prevented for fear that
they will become nuisances. 33 On the other hand, if the occu-
pant of neighboring land fails to protest the establishment of an
enterprise, this failure to protest may be used against him in
subsequent litigation.
Conclusion
None of the foregoing factors can be described as ordinarily
conclusive. The weight of each in the balancing process in any
given nuisance case varies with the presence or absence of the
others. In no other area of the law do the implications of the
decisions seem more difficult to trace.
Billy H. Hines
Separation of the Jury in Criminal Trials
The common law system of criminal procedure, which was
adopted in the Territory of Orleans by the Crimes Act of 1805,1
requires that there be no separation of the jury during a crim-
inal trial.2 This rule was adopted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the first time in 1844 in the case of State v. Hornsby,3
and, with little change, is now included in Article 394 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928:
"From the moment of the acceptance of any juror until
the rendition of verdict or the entry of a mistrial, as the
case may be, the jurors shall be kept together under the
charge of an officer in such a way as to be secluded from
all outside communication; provided that in cases not capi-
tal the judge may, in his discretion, permit the jurors to
separate at any time before the actual delivery of his
charge."
The object of this comment is to present an analysis of the
32. Canone v. Pailet, 160 La. 159, 106 So. 730 (1926); New Orleans v.
Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910); cf. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes,
Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100 (1952); Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138(1926); Hill v. Battalion Washington Artillery of City of New Orleans, 143
La. 533, 78 So. 844 (1918).
33. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100
(1952); Bell v. A. Riggs & Bro., 38 La. Ann. 555 (1886).
1. La. Acts 1805, c. 50, § 33, p. 440.
2. 1 CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 632 et seq. (1819).
. 8 Rob. 554 (La. 1844).
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